Aici puteti gasi buletinele informative trimestriale (Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin) ale spionajului militar american. Buletinele informative cuprind perioada oct.-dec. 1995 - apr.-iun. 2009.
Multumesc, Ronin. Foarte interesant link. Voi incepe sa citesc pe indelete articolele existente in portalul respectiv.
Cu placere Radu P. La tine m-am gandit atunci cand l-am preluat.(printre altii) Iti asteptam cartea. Sper sa prinzi bine legatura dintre "humint" si "operatii speciale".
Dupa cum ai observat deja, pe forumul pe care il conduc de ceva timp (spyology) ruleaza un script care ataseaza un link automat atunci cand tu utilizezi copy/paste ca sa produci postari in numele tau pe alte forumuri. Ar fi fost civilizat sa utilizezi ghilimelele sau macar sa indici sursa. Eu chiar muncesc la postarile de acel gen, nu plagiez pe nimeni. Faptul ca ai sters voit link-ul automat nu iti face cinste.
Forumul pe care il conduc este departe de a avea valoarea celui de fata. Tocmai de aceea ma simt onorat de existenta unui link permanent spre Spyology. Si da, spre deosebire de tine eu nu adaug singur link-urile spre forumul meu. Nu ma intereseaza nici traficul, nici numarul de utilizatori, nici numarul de postari. Nu fac insa rabat la calitate si nu admit ca munca mea (fie ea putina su nu) sa fie insusita de altii. Trebuie sa intelegi ca lumea este mica, ne calcam pe bombeu in acest domeniu. Cu certitudine link-ul infiintat de catre administratorii Semperfidelis este vizitat de cei interesati. Nu numai de catre tine.
Si inca ceva: ceea ce nu ai inteles este ca eu nu "am preluat" acea mica postare. Pur si simplu am adunat informatiile, m-am documentat cu ajutorul colaboratorilor de la Intellforum si am postat un link cu un mic comentariu.
O viitoare polemica pe aceasta tema nu are rost, motivele sunt meschine si cronofage.
Stiu, postarea mea este off topic, insa am considerat ca acesta este locul potrivit pentru a raspunde. Utilizatorului Radu Patrascu ii cer scuze pentru faptul ca m-am abatut cu mult de la topicul deschis.
offtopic: mi se pare un pic exagerata replica ta, spyology, pentru o simpla propozitie postata de ronin, cu atit mai mult cu cit a fost introdus si link-ul catre postarea din forumul tau... ronin s-a dovedit mereu corect pe site-ul nostru, drept pentru care mi-e greu sa cred ca pe altele ar proceda altfel... in al doilea rind, nimeni nu se calca pe bombeu cu nimeni, fiindca forumurile noastre sint complet diferite atit ca tematica, cit si ca anvergura (cum tu singur ai spus-o)... link-ul catre spyology l-am bagat in prima pagina in semn de apreciere a muncii depuse de tine pe o nisa pe care nu multi se incumeta sa intre...
Radu, scuze si pentru replica mea, sper sa nu ne bagi in seama si sa continui postarile tale, fiindca e unul dintre cele mai bune topicuri de pe acest forum...
"nu este nervos, ci calm; stăpân pe stările interioare; optimist; tip controlat; răbdător;" LINK
on: Cartierul general NSA, undeva langa Washington DC.
"Iata ca NSA (National Security Agency) s-a gandit la comemorarea criptologilor care au "servit in tacere" interesele SUA si au cazut la datorie sau si-au dedicat viata criptologiei si criptografiei. Zidul, ridicat in 1996 cuprinde un numar de 161 de numeale personalului militar si civil din Armata, Marina, Fortele Aeriene care si-au dat viata servind interesele USA."
Cred ca (si) la acest capitol, romanii exceleaza.
Citeşte mai mult: LINK vizitati spyology - intelligence online spyology
Fata de britanici, in SUA lucrurile se petrec in mod diferit. Asta si pentru ca dimensiunile USSOCOM pot satisface ambitiiile celui mai compentent ofiter. Numai JSOC (structura care comanda 1st SFOD-D, DEVGRU, ISA, JSCU etc) are in fruntea sa 5 generali: unul cu 3 stele, doi cu 2 stele si inca doi cu o stea. Asadar, cariera unui ofiter se poate desfasura de la intrarea in serviciu pana la retragere doar in USSOCOM (au existat cazuri). In ceea ce priveste specializare, la 1 oct. 1984, US Army a creat specializarea Special Forces pentru subofiteri, career management field 18 (CMF 18), urmata, la scurt timp, de cea a maistrilor militari -traducere aproximativa a termenului de "warrant officer" (18 OA), iar la 9 aprilie 1987, pentru ofiteri (18A). Mi se pare interesant nu doar modul in care militari ajung din Special Forces, de exemplu, in 1st SFOD-D, ci si drumul in sens invers, dinspre Delta spre Special Forces (asta este valabil pentru ofiterii din Delta care anterior nu au fost in SF -multi provenind din batalioanele regimentului 75 Rangers).
(2) Alternate accession method. As an alternate accession method, an officer may branch transfer to Special Forces by first joining one of the Army’s SMUs, such as the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (1st SFOD-D). This unit is specially accessed, trained and organized to conduct a broad range of special operations missions. Officers volunteering for 1st SFOD-D must meet the following prerequisites: (a) Be a captain or a major. (b) Be a Captains Career Course (OAC) graduate. (c) Be a college graduate. (d) Have successfully commanded for a minimum of 12 months at the captain branch qualifying level. (e) Have passed a High Altitude Low Opening (HALO)/Selfc o n t a i n e d U n d e r w a t e r B r e a t h i n g A p p a r a t u s ( S C U B A ) p h y s i c a l examination. (f) Have passed the Army Physical Fitness Test and be able to swim 100 meters while wearing combat boots and the BDU. (g) Have successfully completed both the 1st SFOD-D Assessment and Selection program, and the 1st SFOD-D Operator Training Course. (h) Must branch transfer to Special Forces branch at the grade of captain or, on a case by case basis, at the grade of major if branch qualifying standards can be met prior to selection to lieutenant colonel. If the officer elects to branch transfer to Special Forces, 1st S F O D - D t r o o p c o m m a n d e r d u t y w i l l c o n s t i t u t e S p e c i a l F o r c e s branch qualification at the grades of captain and major. The officer must successfully complete SFDOQC prior to branch transfer. All officers who volunteer for an extension of their current SFOD assignments or volunteer for follow-on SFOD assignments must meet the standards of 1st SFOD-D’s Formal Periodic Assessment Process or Follow-on Reassessment Process. Repetitive assignments to 1st SFOD-D should be consistent with the needs of the Army, the unit and the officer’s professional development.
sursa: Department of the Army Pamphlet 600–3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management, p. 80-81
Daca un capitan din SFOD-D, comandant de troop (numarul operatorilor care servesc in acest esalom este secret, dar se pare ca depaseste 20) doreste sa intre in SF, unde va comanda un SFOD-A de 12 militari, va fi asadar, nevoit sa absolve SFDOQC (Special Forces Detachment Officer Qualification Course) care ii aduce specializarea 18A, nefiind obligata sa parcurga SFAS (Special Forces Assessment and Selection, presupunandu-se ca selectia pentru Delta a fost mai grea. Maiorii di locotenenti-coloneii din SFOD-D care doresc sa patrunda in Special Forces nu sunt obligati, in schimb, sa absolve niciunul din aceste cursuri, dupa cum o dovedeste fragmentul de mai jos:
Special Forces Operational Detachment-D, although not an SF unit, is a uniquely trained, highly responsive, low-profile special-operations unit with many SF officer authorizations. Chapter 14 of DA Pam 600-3, Officer Professional Development, dated June 8, 1995, discusses the integration of SFODD service into the SF officer’s career life cycle. It may be summarized as follows: A non-SF branch member may be accessed into SF after being accessed into SFOD-D. He must complete the SFOD-D Assessment and Selection and the SFOD-D Operators Training Course. If the officer elects to transfer to the SF Branch, SFOD-D troop-commander service will fulfill SFcaptain branch qualification. SFAS is waiverable, but the officer must complete SFDOQC to branch-transfer. A qualified SF Branch officer who volunteers for SFOD-D must attend the SFOD-D Assessment and Selection and the SFOD-D Operators Training Course. SF branch-qualifying positions in SFOD-D are squadron operations officer (major); SFOD-D deputy commander (lieutenant colonel); and squadron commander (lieutenant colonel — an “additional qualification,” per DA Pam 600-3). SF officers are encouraged to seek SFOD-D assignments but to balance assignments between “black” and “white” SOF. A combination of assignments can enhance an officer’s professional qualifications and career opportunities, especially for command selection. Officers who spend most of their careers either in SFOD-D or in SF groups are unlikely to be “best-qualified” for DA selection as a commander in the other type of unit.
sursa: Special Warfare. The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare and School, October 1995 Vol. 8, No. 4, p. 43.
De observat flexibilitatea care i se recomanda ofiterului in managementul carierei sale.
In interiorul comunitatii pentru operatiuni speciale americane exista alte probleme. Acestea sunt legate, mai ales, de subutilizarea capacitatilor asociate razzboiului neconventional, specific Fortelor Speciale, in raport cu cele care le revin unitatilor cu expertiza in actiuni directe (SFOD-D, DEVGRU, SEALs, Rangers, 160 SOAR etc). Comandantii acestora din urma, aflate sub umbrela JSOC, au o buna relatie cu fortele mainstream. Datorita acestui fapt, numerosi ofiteri din structura JSOC sunt promovati, fapt care se reflecta asupra modului de a actiona al USSOCOM. In schimb, un singur ofiter din Special Forces, John Mulholland, actualul comandant USASOC (US Army Special Operations Command) a ajuns la gradul de general cu 3 stele. Vocile celor din USSF, care pledeaza abordarea indirecta ca metoda adecvata de contrainsurgenta se pare ca se fac tot mai putin auzite, daca este cazul sa dam crezare cel putin urmatorului document:
Demise of the Green Berets? Soldier of Fortune | Maj. Gen. James Guest, USA | April 16, 2008 Bookmark and Share
For a glimpse into the future of Special Forces, read the Capstone Concept for Special Operations on the USSOCOM web site. Read through it carefully. Can you find the words "Special Forces" anywhere? Or "Special Forces group?" Can you find "ODA" (operational detachment - alpha)? Or "ODB" (operational detachment - bravo)? Or "Special Forces battalion?"
You can't find these words. We can read that as a strong signal that you won't be able to find Special Forces anywhere before very long. Many other signals suggest that the senior leadership in both United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and Department of the Army (DA) are working to do away with the Green Berets. The generals at USSOCOM and in the Pentagon have been blurring the distinctions between Special Forces and special operations forces (SOF) units (Rangers, JSOC, SEALs, Delta, et al.) for some time. We now see references to "Air Force special forces," "Navy special forces," and "Marine special forces" but we rarely see the term "U. S. Army Special Forces." We do see "Army SOF," which only describes a grouping of forces, not a capability. We do see SF ODAs referred to as "special operations detachments," another sad precursor of the future.
The Capstone Concept for Special Operations being developed for USSOCOM includes the concept "global expeditionary forces," and all indications point to the intent to replace the SF groups with this new concept. The organizational charts are changing, too, and the plans are for these global expeditionary forces to work directly for USSOCOM worldwide in a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)-like configuration. Although the security assistance force (SAF) concept is a much more streamlined and effective mechanism for utilizing U. S. Army Special Forces-the SAF is regionally oriented and works directly for the combatant commander-it has been discarded.
Is USA SF Being Eviscerated?
Is this a ploy to be able to take the ODAs and use them operationally without going through the group headquarters (HQ), including the group Special Forces operating bases (SFOB)? Since 1952, conventional force headquarters have attempted to neutralize Special Forces command and control by treating the group and battalion HQ as non-operational administrative units, the purpose of which is to maintain ODAs in order that conventional units, such as JSOC, can cherry-pick them to use as support for their own missions. Reportedly, SF troops are already under the operational control of JSOC. JSOC is using the Green Berets for JSOC's own ends, whether to gather intelligence for JSOC missions or to carry out "special missions" that, if successful, JSOC can take the credit for. You can imagine who will suck up the blame if such a "special mission" goes south.
How can Special Forces be neutralized in this way? If those who want to do away with the Green Berets are successful, they will need the full support of the senior leadership of the U. S. Army. Will they do away with the Special Forces officer branch? The Special Forces warrant officer branch? The Special Forces NCO career management fields (CMF)? To date, we merely have the unusual spectacle of a relatively small unit (USSOCOM)-however joint they may be-taking control of an entire United States Army branch.
The Army transferred control of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center (SWC) and School from Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) in 1990. USASOC has since taken the combat developments capability out of SWC and made it a staff section of USASOC HQ. Bear in mind that this office is the heartbeat (perhaps also the brain) of the force developments and requirements process, and therefore has a major, if not controlling voice in all future concept development, acquisitions, organization, and support doctrine for Special Forces. This, in turn, impacts recruitment, promotions, training, and equipping the force; doctrinal studies and publications; and concept developments to support Special Forces. This also impacts U. S. Army psychological operations and civil affairs concepts and developments. Since this power node was moved from SWC to USASOC, SWC is now a pygmy in the lineup of U.S. Army schools. A harbinger of the future is the recent cut of 13 million dollars from the SWC budget.
Marine Specops Intrude
Another indication that SWC's leadership position in the unconventional warfare (UW) arena is disappearing is that on 27 June 2007, the USMC formally activated the Marine Special Operations School. The stated intent of the USMC senior leadership is that it will become "the premier FID [foreign internal defense] and Unconventional Warfare University in the entire SOF community."
Approval from USSOCOM was required for this duplication of effort, as well as for the above-quoted statement. There can be no true duplication for many years, if ever. The culture of the USMC will be even less amenable to the necessities of working with, through, and by indigenous people than the culture of the conventional Army. The Marines are a world-class service and a superb fighting force, but they are new to FID and new to unconventional warfare. Many a harsh lesson awaits them if they are going to try to replace the Green Berets. U. S. Army Special Forces has been increasing in proficiency and experience in counterinsurgency (COIN), FID, UW, and international security assistance missions for more than a half century.
Are the Marines willing to take the slots out of their own hide and form up more than 300 Special Forces-type operational detachments? Why would USSOCOM leaders be willing for the USMC to start this effort from scratch, when time is of the essence? Is USSOCOM willing to hand over U. S. Army Special Forces personnel authorizations to the USMC so they can become the premier FID and UW warriors of the future? Is somebody selling wolf tickets?
Specops Tactics Turned Upside Down
In the USSOCOM Capstone Concept, the TTP for conducting Special Forces operations are turned on their heads. This developing concept speaks in terms of pulling everything back to the continental United States (CONUS) and of deploying JSOC units in the same way as carrier battle groups (CBG) and Marine expeditionary units (MEU), instead of doing what has worked so well for so long for Special Forces. Look on pages 9 and 10 of the Capstone Concept, under "Global Expeditionary Force." While this concept would work for raids and other direct actions (such as JSOC, Rangers, SEALs, and USAF Special Tactics Teams are trained to conduct), if USSOCOM attempts to steal the mission of Special Forces by using this model, they will merely create a "roving gnome," who will soon be calling for backup. In short, the USSOCOM Capstone Concept totally ignores the demonstrated and historically successful Special Forces operational concept of working by, with, and through those we are helping.
As a result of more than fifty years of fine tuning, each Special Forces group now operates in its assigned region. Group HQ deploy joint combined exchange training (JCET) teams to enhance bilateral relations and interoperability with regional nations through military-to-military contact. These U. S. Special Forces JCET teams establish long-term relationships with indigenous personnel. They work to improve regional unit combat skills and observance of humanitarian requirements. They develop trust between host nations and the USA, with a program tailored to meet specific needs as identified by Green Berets on the ground. This capability will disappear with the Green Berets, and no SOF "shock-and awe" can replace it.
Armchair Specops
Compared to the lean organization of Special Forces, the USSOCOM model creates a bureaucracy with too many supervisors for too few workers, with the supervisors far away from the action. Money that would be better spent on the mission will be used for funding extra layers of chair-borne supervisors. Worse, an unwieldy organization will get in the way of accomplishing the mission. The men on the ground have a much better feel for what they need to do and how best to do it, while the top-down bureaucratic rigidity frustrates more than it facilitates.
Will these newly created bureaucratic slots be filled with Special Forces officers and NCOs? What do you think? The conventional officers who have risen to the highest ranks through their connections with JSOC, Delta, the Rangers, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, and the SEALs will be in charge. There is only one Special Forces officer (newly promoted) above the rank of major general, so, once again, Special Forces are being decapitated and will be under the ultimate command of those who have never gone through selection and assessment, never attended the SFOC, never served a tour on an ODA, and never served repeated assignments in a SFG(A).
The 2006 version of the USSOCOM Capstone Concept that we can access online does not show the new organizational charts that are presently proposed for the global expeditionary forces in the 2007 Capstone Concept. They are classified, but in the end there may be more than a dozen staff officers and NCOs for every soldier who will be assigned the mission on the ground. Reliable sources state that, even now, there are more than 130 (perhaps as many as 160) U. S. Army E-9s in Army special mission units assigned to JSOC. When that is compared with the 13 to15 E-9s in a Special Forces group, it does tend to raise eyebrows. What are they doing? According to the reports, thirteen of them are packing parachutes.
SOF DVD w/o SF
In April 2007, USSOCOM put out a 20-minute DVD celebrating its twentieth anniversary. Even though Special Forces personnel make up the greatest part of the USSOCOM forces, the U. S. Army Special Forces are never once mentioned in this DVD. Although Special Forces is the oldest force in USSOCOM and has been the USSOCOM workhorse since its inception, not one Green Beret is seen in the montage of photographs.
Colonel Banks is not mentioned in the historical overview, or General Yarborough, or General Healy. There is no reference to Colonel Bull Simons, to Colonel Charlie Beckwith, nor to General Joe Lutz. Yet without these men, the path to the present day in United States "special operations" would be difficult to imagine. Most amazingly, the DVD makes no reference to President John F. Kennedy, who supported the establishment of Special Forces in 1961.
Will Special Forces exist ten or twenty years down the road? What can we do to ensure the continuing existence and contribution of the Green Berets?
It is time to fight again, this time for the preservation of the force. If we do not protest the poor stewardship of the U. S. Army and USSOCOM leaders concerning U. S. Army Special Forces and its unique capability, we will certainly see this capability diminish.
Asa cum observa intr-un studiu Matthew Modarelli, 'Military Police Operations and Counterinsurgency', (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/151-modarelli.pdf) apetenta SUA pentru procedeele specifice razboiului neregulat lasa de dorit, in special in ceea ce priveste folosirea localnicilor ca sursa de informatii in mmediul in care fortele americane opereaza.
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