Special Forces are the combat element of Special Operations Forces that conduct Special Operations. Special Operations Command contains the main elements of Special Operation Forces, including the units that contain Special Forces within the Australian Army.
O definitie de la australieni: Special Forces play a vital role in the Special Operations Command mission to provide ready and relevant forces to conduct special operations in support of Australia's national interests.
Special Forces (SF) are soldiers and officers who have completed all selection program requirements and have been selected to serve with the Special Air Service (SAS) or Commando units
Felictiari domnului general de brigada Ciolponea, comandantul Birgazii 6 Operatiuni Speciale "Mihai Viteazul" Targu Mures "Acordare grad militar: • Decret privind acordarea gradului de general de brigadă – cu o stea domnului colonel Ciolponea Constantin-Adrian din Ministerul Apărării Naţionale;"
Poate ca e redundant, dar la randul meu, il felicit pe domnul general de brigada Adrian Ciolponea cu prilejul avansarii si le doresc numai bine celor din Brigada 6 Operatii Speciale.
Marţi, 25 octombrie, ministrul Apărării Naţionale Gabriel Oprea va participa, începând cu ora 9.00, la ceremonia militară organizată de Ziua Armatei României, la Monumentul Eroilor militari români căzuţi la datorie, amplasat în Parcul Tineretului din Bucureşti, şi începând cu ora 12.30, la ceremonia de la sediul Brigăzii 6 Operaţii Speciale din Târgu Mureş.
Ziua Armatei României va fi sărbătorită prin arborarea Drapelului Naţional la toate sediile instituţiilor militare, ridicarea Marelui Pavoaz la bordul navelor militare maritime şi fluviale şi prin organizarea unor ceremonii militare şi activităţi comemorative în toate garnizoanele din ţară, în teatrele de operaţii şi în ţările în care România are acreditaţi ataşaţi ai apărării.
În Capitală, începând cu ora 11.00, vor mai avea loc ceremonii militare la Monumentul Eroilor din al II-lea Război Mondial, amplasat în faţa Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare "Carol I", şi la Mormântul Ostaşului Necunoscut din Parcul Carol.
Militarii Regimentului 30 Gardă "Mihai Viteazul" vor desfăşura o ceremonie de retragere cu torţe, începând cu ora 18.30, pe următorul itinerar: Palatul Cercului Militar Naţional, Bulevardul Regina Elisabeta, Piaţa Operei, Piaţa Leu, Bulevardul General Vasile Milea.
Statele majore ale categoriilor de forţe ale armatei, comandamentele, marile unităţi şi unităţile militare de pe întreg teritoriul ţării organizează, cu acest prilej, Ziua Porţilor Deschise şi activităţi cultural-artistice şi sportive, simpozioane, întâlniri cu veteranii de război, expoziţii, gale de filme şi spectacole.
În ţările în care România are acreditaţi ataşaţi ai apărării se vor organiza expoziţii de carte, de publicaţii şi fotografie, cu tematică militară, precum şi ceremonii de depuneri de coroane şi jerbe de flori la cimitire şi monumente ale ostaşilor români.
Militarii români din teatrele de operaţii vor sărbători Ziua Armatei prin organizarea unor ceremonii militare şi a unor activităţi culturale şi sportive la care vor fi invitaţi şi parteneri din coaliţiile multinaţionale.Ţ
@Mihai, este logic ca SAS nu se subordoneaza brigazii. Dar ma gandesc ca daca englezii actioneaza in Helmand, acolo se gaseste si SAS-ul. Problema nu e de subordonare ci de a actiona in aceeasi operatie, pe acelasi teren. High Value Targets sunt zeci pe o arie de cativa kilometri patrati. High Value Targets sunt si langa gardul bazei in care stau eu probabil. De asta este nevoie de forte speciale. Referitor la englezi, misiunile pe care le executa fortele conventionale nu au nicio limita din punct de vedere al complexitatii sau importantei. Executa misiuni pe care noi le putem descrie drept speciale, la orice ora, in orice situatie, indiferent de tinta. Daca este nevoie sa captureze se duc si captureaza, daca este nevoie sa distruga un compound se duc si il distrug, nu ii opreste nimeni, nu au nevoie de forte speciale, nu au nevoie de nicio aprobare de la niciun comandament. Comandantii romani au avut in subordine subunitati mai deosebite? La ce subunitati combatante deosebite te referi? SOCEUR nu stie mai bine unde trebuie folosite fortele speciale in Afganistan. Presupun ca prin SOCEUR intelegi comandamentul fortelor speciale din Europa. Pe teren sunt comandanti cu fortele lor si atat. Sunt zone intinse unde este nevoie de forte de infanterie si unde insurgentii au safe-heaven-uri deci oricum fortele nu sunt de ajuns. Am enumerat cateva probleme care fac ca progresul in Afganistan sa fie incetinit si ai spus ca in realitate lucrurile sunt mai complexe, dar nu ai dat exemple. Crezi ca lucrurile enumerate nu sunt suficient de complexe? Sunt foarte complexe, greu de controlat, greu de perceput chiar. Coruptia de exemplu este un fenomen care nu poate fi controlat intr-o tara democratica, dezvoltata, plina de mass-media. Cat despre solutia miraculoasa, cred ca m-am facut deja inteles ca nu cred in acest lucru, nici macar intr-o solutie care nu este miraculoasa. Ceea ce am scris despre lipsa unei delimitari clare dintre strategic, operativ si tactic nu este o legenda ci modul in care percep lucrurile. Nivelul operativ nici nu exista. Imaginea campului de lupta nu este cea clasica, pentru ca nu exista un camp de lupta. In realitate vorbim in Afganistan despre nivelurile provincial si cel local. Evident Clausewitz nu a vazut si nici nu si-a imaginat cum ar arata un razboi dus in Asia in secolul XXI. ANA sunt intr-adevar oameni in care nu poti avea incredere. Nu se prezinta atunci cand vrei sa pleci in misiune, nu te intelegi cu ei, si unii comandanti le-au dat prea multa libertate. Dar nu sunt toti asa. Multi dintre ei au experienta multor lupte cu talibanii si ii cunosc foarte bine. Oricum ar fi, este nevoie de ei.
Foarte buna analiza. De mult nu am mai citit una asa de buna. Singura mea completare. Pe zi ce trece militarii ANA devin tot mai buni. Si tot mai seriosi din cauza banilor. Un ANA duce in spate poate juma de trib/sat, etc. Si nu le convine sa renunte. Acuma unii dintre ei sunt "convinsi" sa renunte de catre cei de acasa la presiunea "railor". De aceea este si politica de detasare a ANA in alte parti decat cea in care este familia (cei din nord merg in sud si invers).
Pana la urma ce cuprinde aceasta brigada de op spec? Este o simpla transformare a regimentului in brigada? Si vi se pare in regula atribuirea aceleasi denumiri onorifice mai multor unitati si/sau mari unitati?
Foarte buna analiza. De mult nu am mai citit una asa de buna. Singura mea completare. Pe zi ce trece militarii ANA devin tot mai buni. Si tot mai seriosi din cauza banilor. Un ANA duce in spate poate juma de trib/sat, etc. Si nu le convine sa renunte. Acuma unii dintre ei sunt "convinsi" sa renunte de catre cei de acasa la presiunea "railor". De aceea este si politica de detasare a ANA in alte parti decat cea in care este familia (cei din nord merg in sud si invers).
Oleaca de off-topic,de incalzire. Problema cu ANA nu e ca trupetii lor invata sa se miste acceptabil pana la nivel pluton(in 10 ani era cazul sa invete chiar mai mult).ANA in sine,cu toate progresele este din capul locului o institutie disfunctionala.Castiga un soldat afgan cat un soldat roman de acasa,dar loialitatea nu e spre Kabul ci catre trib.Intre noi fie vorba,Kabul,Karzai si tot GIROA nu merita mai mult decat soarta lui Gaddafi.In absenta cadrelor vestice ANA ar redevini rapid o adunatura de impiedicati,intrucat cu cateva exceptii notabile ,grosul corpului ofiteresc e selectat pe pile.Unitati din ANA si chiar din aNP au luptat bine in Helmand anul trecut,dar numai avand atasati 15-20 consilieri/batalion.Care consilieri au fost de fapt comandanti. Pana in 2014 negraciul din Casa Alba zice ca se vor retrage.Generalul Allen zice invers,ca vor mai ramane un numar inca nedeterminat de consilieri,unitati CT si elemente de sprijin.Fapt e ca ANA nu va fi in stare sa formeze cadre suficiente in 3 ani,pt. ca Karzai(cakofonie deliberata) nu are interesul(din teama).Cumulata cu probabila scadere a sprijinului financiar si logistic,ANA are putine sanse sa se dezvolte,dar multe sa regreseze.Iar daca incepe razboiul intre Karzai,talibani si pakistanezi pe o parte si uzbeci,tadjici si hazara,cu Saleh si Dostum la carma, pe de alta,ANA se sparge rapid.
Si inca ceva.Marines au facut pe zmeii in Kandahar,Helmand si Nimruz pt ca :a-sunt Marines si ca atare au ignorat ROE fatate de contopistii din Kabul b-sunt Marines si ca atare sunt o forta integrata,cu propriul suport aerian,logistic etc... c-sunt Marines si ca atare si-au permis sa impuna din capul locului ca obiectivul sa fie in concordanta cu fortele existente. Aceste conditii nu au putut fi replicate in restul zonelor fierbinti,sau nu la nivelul optim,cu toate intaririle. Daca ISAF,cu o comanda in sfarsit coerenta,cu intariri masive si capacitati pe la care ANA nu va ajunge in veci nu poate controla guvernarea paralela si retelele talibanilor(care-s de mai multe feluri,dar sa simplificam),rezulta ca baietii rai se vor distra dupa retragerea NATO. Pt. inceput,triburile sunt din oficiu neutre si oportuniste.Pot sa vanda agentii ''railor'' si pot deconspira caile de comunicatii,etc... dar numai daca vad ca ''forta albastra'' e cu sange in vine si-i casapeste cu succes pe adversari.Altfel,vor lua banii,vor pastra poate linistea si pacea,dar vor plati taxe administratiei din umbra adverse iar la primul semn de slabiciune vor trece cu arme si bagaje in tabara lor. ANA e destul sa piarda controlul drumurilor pt. a pierde razboiul.Populatia nu o vor controla din fix motivul mentionat mai sus,personalul e rotit.Iar cand NATO va face un pas inapoi,Pakistanul va intra in hora cu spor.Ei oricum sunt in tabara rivala pe fata,dar mai au ceva jena.Cand vor incepe sa le paseze niscaiva ATGM si MANPAD unitatilr lor din prima linie,adio ANA.Nici nu trebe multe,vreo 100-200 bucati,cat sa transmita mesajul de salut.
LAGHMAN, Afghanistan — The American Special Forces officer was having what one colleague says was the worst day of his war tour. And that was before the Soviet-made anti-personnel mine packed with 700 ball bearings exploded at his feet.
A weapon like that can turn a man into “pink mist,” the officer says.
It was late September outside the town of Mehtar Lam, in this hilly province just east of Kabul. The officer from the Germany-based 10th Special Forces Group — let’s call him “Tom” — had been leading his patrol of U.S. commandos and Afghan police trainees on the long walk back to base following a disappointing encounter with Taliban fighters in which half of the trainees failed to fight back.
Tom glimpsed a mound of disturbed earth and, not thinking, approached it. ‘A weapon like that can turn a man into pink mist.’
The mine concealed inside the mound was a dud, its main charge decayed by time and neglect. Only a precursor charge went off, resulting in a “pop” sound that sent the officer into a spasm of action. He gave a hand signal that sent his troops running for cover, in case the malfunctioned mine was just the first salvo in complex ambush. “God, please don’t let me fuck up,” he recalls thinking.
But the mine was apparently meant to be a stand-alone attack. Nothing else exploded. No Taliban fighters opened up with machine guns, AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades. Only after realizing this did Tom have the luxury of feeling anything. “My first reaction was anger,” Tom says. Anger not only at his would-be attackers, but also at himself. Walking up to the mine “was a JV [junior varsity] move,” he admits.
Tom’s frustration deepened as he tried to get his Afghan police trainees to learn from the mistake. The tall Special Forces officer, in his late 30s with a shaved head and a thick beard, recalls showing the now-harmless explosive device to one of his best Afghan cops, who would later earn a reputation for charging straight into enemy fire.
The American’s aim was to teach the Afghan to fear explosives, and keep a close watch for them in the future. “But he didn’t get it,” Tom recalls. To the cop, avoiding a bomb blast isn’t a function of superior tactics or, failing that, luck born of the device’s long neglect by insurgent fighters. No, the troops’ lucky escape from the fizzling mine “was a direct representation of the intervention of God,” Tom says.
For six months, Tom and the approximately 18 U.S. and Romanian commandos he leads have struggled to prepare a new, largely unknown style of Afghan police unit — a Provincial Response Company — to begin enforcing some real law and order in Laghman, a violent, Rhode Island-sized province of some 400,000 people.
It’s all part of the international coalition’s evolving plan to turn over all of Afghanistan to local security forces by the end of 2014, steadily withdrawing conventional combat troops while reinforcing the Special Operations Forces — including the U.S. Army’s Green Berets, NATO commando formations, the highly secretive Army Delta Force and U.S. Navy SEALs — that will stay behind.
This “Special Force-ization” of the Afghanistan War is no panacea. Special Forces pride themselves in their ability to work within any culture. They blend in, live off the land, learn the local languages and customs, forge unlikely alliances and adapt, endlessly adapt, in pursuit of subtle strategic goals. “We’re problem-solvers,” Tom says.
But as cultural problems go, Afghanistan is a particularly difficult one for outsiders. Understanding the rugged, landlocked country can be hard, even for highly trained warriors like Tom. A decade into the U.S.-led intervention, the coalition is still learning this important truth.
Tom’s futile lesson in bomb-avoidance was, in the balance, a minor failure — but one indicative of a much deeper problem, one that will continue to shape international efforts in Afghanistan as the conflict enters its new “Special” phase.
“Look at the magnitude of the problem,” he says. “I am not cynical about this, but I recognize the magnitude. Lots of people frame the problem in simplistic terms that are not realistic.”
Among those unrealistic terms: the idea that Afghanistan’s problems can be resolved quickly, and by mere killing. Boosting security in Afghanistan means reinforcing the rule of law. That’s a daunting, long-term process requiring more education and institutional reform than combat, Tom notes.
Fortunately, education and reform in a conflict zone are two of Special Forces’ unique strengths. More and more, the Afghanistan War is a commando war. That can mean high-profile, lethal raids such as the May killing of Osama Bin Laden by U.S. Navy SEALs. More so, it means specialized troops negotiating what is, for many Westerners, a confusing and frustrating culture — all in an effort to help Afghans help themselves. And in a deadly country where dud bombs are the least of the perils.
U.S. Special Forces attack Taliban positions in October, 2001. Photo: U.S. Army From Guerrillas to Guerrilla-Fighters
Commandos have been on the Afghanistan war’s front lines since the start.
On the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, in the homes of Special Forces soldiers all over the U.S. and Europe, phones were ringing. Tom was at his then-girlfriend’s house in Washington, D.C., sleeping off the accumulated fatigue of a long peacetime deployment. He hung up the phone without answering.
Then his girlfriend, a government employee, called to say “they” were attacking New York. “They blew up the State Department!” she kept saying, according to Tom. He had to re-assure her that, whatever was happening, it was certainly not a nuclear war. Driving to pick her up, Tom saw smoke billowing from the Pentagon. Everything about the war changed, except that U.S. Special Forces are still on the ground, working closely with Afghan troops.
Special Forces led America’s response to the 9/11 attacks. Within weeks, a 12-man Green Beret team, led by Tom’s friend Capt. Mitch Nelson, was on the ground practicing one of Special Forces’ unique skills: “unconventional warfare.” That is, organizing local fighters into guerrilla forces and leading them into battle.
Nelson found himself helping an Uzbek warlord named Abdul Rashid Dostum lead 1,500 Northern Alliance cavalry in thundering charges against the Taliban’s much more modern army.
When a senior officer impatiently demanded an update on Nelson’s progress, the sleepless Green Beret testily relayed a now-famous message: “I am advising a man on how to best employ light infantry and horse cavalry in the attack against Taliban T-55s [tanks], mortars, artillery, personnel carriers and machine guns – a tactic which I think became outdated with the invention of the Gatling gun.”
But it worked … for a time. The Taliban collapsed, only to regroup as an insurgency. More than a decade later, Afghan troops have traded their horses for vehicles and machine guns of their own. The Taliban are the ones relying on audacity and clever tactics to even the odds. But one thing hasn’t changed: U.S. Special Forces are still on the ground, still working closely with Afghan troops.
Tom’s roughly 100-strong Provincial Response Company is one of around 20 such units across Afghanistan. The PRCs, formed two years ago, are meant to blend the functions of a big-city American SWAT team and the U.S. Marshal Services.
“They’re smaller but have got more capability to go reinforce other Afghan Uniform Police if the security situation exceeds [the AUPs'] ability to handle it,” Peltier explains. “We also train these guys to do high-risk arrests.”
“The idea is that the provincial chief of police and the prosecutors come together and, if there’s evidence a crime was committed, they will generate a warrant, which the PRC will go and execute,” says Lt. Col. Isaac Peltier, Tom’s commanding officer from the Combined Special Operations Task Force 10.
It doesn’t matter to Peltier whether the perpetrator is a hardcore, foreign Taliban, a Taliban sympathizer from Afghanistan or just someone motivated entirely by greed or revenge. “We’re not so much threat-based,” he says. “We’re encouraging Afghans — at least, the police force we work with — to focus on the criminal aspects and enforce rule of law.”
In focusing on police forces and the rule of law, Green Berets are trying to fight a war without fighting a war. There’s not a lot of intensive combat. Ideally, no one gets killed — although, in practice, there are plenty of bodies. Tom, for his part, doesn’t even like calling what’s going on in Afghanistan a “war.” “What you call a thing imposes a bias,” he says.
Bias is one thing Tom is desperate to avoid.
Man Culture
At 37, Tom is older than most Special Forces team leaders. He owes his relatively advanced age to an unusual and circuitous entry into the Green Berets.
For starters, despite his perfectly neutral, Midwestern accent, Tom was not born in America. He’s a native of London. His family moved to the U.S. when he was still a little boy. He enlisted in the Army as a teenager and joined Special Forces, the first time, as a junior team member — but only after passing the grueling Qualification Course, or “Q Course.” The more-than-yearlong course includes physical-fitness tests, combat exercises and foreign-language training: Russian and French, in Tom’s case.
Feeling unfulfilled, Tom decided to get his officer’s commission and transferred to the Air Force. But flying C-130s didn’t quite do it for him, either. Tom transferred back to the Army, went through the Q Course again and rejoined the Green Berets as an officer. He spent some time as a Special Forces diver and nearly drowned after getting caught in an undertow off the coast of Florida. Tom doesn’t like calling what’s going on in Afghanistan a ‘war.’
Like many Green Berets, Tom spends most of his time deployed to combat zones. It’s Hell on relationships. Tom’s single, but he keeps a photo of one ex-girlfriend on his bookshelf in his roughly 7-by-7 plywood room at the Special Forces compound in Mehtar Lam. He’s almost dismissive of the photo. But not so his collection of postcards, from friends all over the world. There’s even one postmarked from a research station in Antarctica.
He calls himself a people person but admits he craves solitude. He reads a lot. Business books. A nonfiction account of the rise of hip-hop. History. A smattering of fiction. He asks for book recommendations, offers a few of his own, and has a tendency to “prattle on” — that’s the term he uses — about his latest interest while sipping green tea he makes using a tiny, portable kettle.
Tom never, ever tells war stories … unless you ask. After three or four cups of tea, he might pull up his right pants leg to show you the deep crease left behind by a bullet. He’s more likely to talk about the many friends he’s buried, and show you photos of the memorial services.
He’s critical of his fellow Special Forces who are, he says, too eager to try killing their way out of complex problems. He’s equally critical of the Green Berets’ culture of secrecy. Tom’s determined to keep from the press operational secrets and, per Pentagon rules, his own name and image. He once sent a journalist packing after the nosy scribe walked into a room he’d been told was off-limits.
But in Mehtar Lam Tom welcomes reporters to his compound, talks at length about his goals and methods and swears he’ll be dropping by your place while he’s on leave. “I’ve got a bar tab with your name on it.”
Tom assumed responsibility for the Laghman PRC in August “with trepidation,” he admits. He knew enough about Afghanistan to know how little he truly knew. Even so, he got himself into plenty of trouble. Overhearing the Laghman governor comment on child abuse in the province, Tom says he assumed the governor wanted him to do something about it.
So Tom ordered his PRC trainees to take it easy on the kids in Mehtar Lam. He proudly told the governor what he had done. The Afghan was … mortified. Recounting the conversation, Tom slips into a bad approximation of an Afghan accent. “My friend, you must not do this,” Tom recalls the governor saying. “If a man does not sometimes beat his wife and kids, he will not be respected.”
Tom says he quickly began to appreciate the extent to which Afghanistan is a “man-culture,” big on pride, physical bravado and reputation. Offending that sense of masculinity can be counter-productive — even deadly. Since the war began, no fewer than 70 American troops have died at the hands of their Afghan trainees. Almost all of the killings can be traced to “personal issues,” according to David Sedney, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for Afghanistan.
“I’ve seen too many guys disrespecting their Afghans,” Tom’s weapons sergeant says. Re-assessing their instruction, Tom and his teammates drew up a list of guidelines for dealing with police recruits:
1) No aggressive touching during training, however well-intentioned. It looks like bullying by the generally bigger Americans and it builds resentment among Afghan men conditioned to believe they only dole out physical punishment.
2) Don’t cuss at the Afghans. It’s demeaning. Even if they don’t understand the words, they pick up on the tone. Always speak to the trainees respectfully.
3) Congratulate them frequently and individually.
4) Reward them with symbols of their accomplishments. Fresh new uniforms when they graduate training. Patches for their uniforms after making a major arrest.
“Our PRC saw early on that we treated them with respect,” Tom says. That paid dividends in late September when, after several weeks of daily training, Tom and his team took the first batch police out on their first operational patrol.
Afghan forces training in Laghman Province. Photo: David Axe Cut and Run
The half-dozen Americans and approximately 20 Afghan police walked north from Mehtar Lam. Returning to town the same day, the force “came under fire from 20 to 25 insurgents,” Tom says.
It was a moment of truth for the PRC — and for the Green Berets and their new, more culturally-sensitive training program. Tom admits that unseasoned Afghan troops have a tradition of fleeing when under fire. Expecting a route, the team leader says he was pleasantly surprised that most of his Afghans stood and fought. “They held the line and, in fact, some of them bounded forward.”
The weapons sergeant tells the story slightly differently. He estimates half of the trainees ran from the gunfire. The September skirmish was the worst day of the entire six-month deployment for him, he says. Maybe Tom’s expectations were lower, so his threshold for success was, too. ‘Somebody tackle his ass before he shoots us all!’
On this Tom and his weapons sergeant agree: one police trainee fearlessly advanced on the Taliban ambushers, spraying rounds one-handed from his PKM machine gun. “He must have watched Rambo the night before,” the weapons sergeant says.
Tom was impressed at first, but grew alarmed when the machine gunner started shooting wide of the Taliban. Recalling that the gunner had some vision problems, Tom decided to cut short his little show. “Somebody tackle his ass before he shoots us all,” he ordered. It was a violation of his rule against rough touching, but justified with so many lives at stake.
The Taliban cut and run. The Green Berets and their PRC, having suffered no casualties, regrouped. Tom says he delivered an impromptu “Braveheart speech” and together they headed back to Mehtar Lam.
That’s when Tom blundered into the malfunctioning Soviet mine … and tried and failed to explain to his trainee why the dud explosive was a big deal. Maybe half of Tom’s cops ran. But half didn’t. And the unit can claim to have won that engagement. Overall, the cops’ first patrol was a “unifying experience” for the PRC and their American advisers, Tom says.
But for all their success in honing the training program to better reflect Afghan culture, the Green Berets hadn’t figured out how to bridge the insh’allah gap and get the cops to start thinking tactically, operationally and strategically. Where the PRC had succeeded so far, it could chalk up its success to typical male bravado and the gentle encouragement of the Americans.
That might be fine for a minor firefight. But to secure an entire country against a tenacious insurgency is going to take more than some enthusiastic machine-gunning. It’s going to take some steady, high-end policing within a fair system that adheres to the rule of law. “They’re not there yet,” Peltier says.
“It’s a long-term thing,” Tom seconds. The Pentagon clearly agrees, which is why men like Tom are sticking around even after most U.S. forces depart in 2014. In Afghanistan, Special Forces still have their work cut out for them.
Lasand la o parte lipsa bombelor inteligente din dotarea oastei romane ,ai nostri sunt capabili sa "marcheze" tinte cu laserul (urma lasata de laser ghideaza bombele inteligente)? Uitati despre ce vorbesc: Ceva de citit: LINK LINK LINK ..si ceva imagini:
La noi se numesc cursuri de controlori aerieni in pozitii avansate (FAC). Au loc de ani buni deci se presupune ca exista -unii- care au o oarece pregatire teoretica si practica in sensul asta.
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,ai nostri sunt capabili sa "marcheze" tinte cu laserul (urma lasata de laser ghideaza bombele inteligente)?
