Propun aici sa discutam tot ce are legatura cu aceste zone(aspecte,militare,geopolitice,economice,politice etc...).Din pacate,interesul public e inexistent la noi pt. analiza acestor spatii extrem de importante in secolul 21.Cu toate ca fiecare din noi are ceva produs fie in China,fie in Taiwan sau Japonia prin casa.Cat despre fructificarea oportunitatilor oferite de dezvoltarea acestor zone... Aceasta aberatie istorica vine impotriva traditiilor de prietenie intre Romania si China,in principal.
Pt. inceput un studiu despre armata chineza(il aveam salvat pe hard,asa incat scuze ca nu pot sa dau link).
Tactical Impressions of the People's Liberation Army by LCol (Ret'd) W Yu
Introduction The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has gone through major modernization programs in recent years, both in technique and technology. However, this is a selective process that only a few units receive the latest and the greatest while the vast majority of the military remained obsolescent. Historically and culturally, the PLA tends to concentrate on the big picture rather than on the details which brings into question the relative effectiveness of these specialized units. This author does not even pretend to have any access to the PLA's combat requirements or evaluations. However, based upon publicly available media, certain impressions have occurred. This is an attempt to put those impressions into a coherent picture. The PLA has never been, nor is it now, a modern army. Despite her proud history, her actual performances do not stand up well under close scrutiny. The PLA has experienced some brilliant strategic moves in Korea and to some extent, Vietnam. Yet, the actual battles themselves reveal major weaknesses that never seemed to be addressed, even in subsequent wars. The PLA's major weakness can be summed up as good generals and tenacious infantrymen but nothing in between. So, how is this force expected to fight? While no PLA Field Manual is available for careful analysis (at least not company level and above), there are enough hints form the public media, similar formations, and historical actions to form a conjecture. Cultural Bias Against Battle Details East Asian military history has been dominated by one document: Sun Tzu's the Art of War. The General himself has been a brilliant strategist, tactician, and logistician. However, Chinese historians and generals have emphasized strategic intent over tactical and logistical requirements. As a result, quotes such as "Know your enemy; know yourself and you will never be defeated in a thousand battles" have been stressed over basic requirements such as camping near water or grabbing the high ground for battle. The moves on the chessboard have become more important than the pawns or their positions. Perhaps, the greatest influence on the PLA has to be Mao Tse-Tung and his People's War Concept. Even today, the result of that doctrine has a strong influence on PLA's application. Vietnam's General Vo Nguyen Giap forever immortalizes this strategy. When the enemy attacks, we retreat. When the enemy stalls, we harass. When the enemy retreats, we attack. However, such emphasis strongly implies passive instead of active defence. This severely limited the PLA's development of formation warfare. The main military propaganda emerging from the People's Republic of China (PRC) at the time gave a strong impression of a peasant army being supported by peasants. Aside from the uniforms, there were times when it was hard to distinguish between the militia and the PLA's regular force units. They were similarly armed and often seen performing the same tasks. While much is no doubt propaganda, the final result has been an army very drilled in the basic infantry skills but lacking in higher formation performances. The most recent heralded PLA publication Unrestricted Warfare by Senior Colonel (SrCol) Qiao Liang and SrCol Wang Xiangsui, both Propaganda Officers of the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), suggests that China has "cheap" answers against American military dominance in technology and technique. Unrestricted Warfare advocates the usage of computer viruses to disrupt American Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) systems. To disrupt American airpower, the two SrCols suggest that People's Brigades can close down airbases by posing a direct ground threat. However, the two SrCols left the details to the readers' imagination. Serious military practitioners pressed for details that were not forth coming. Needless to say, it is not as easy it sounds. Western C4I was expected to collapse not because of computer hacking but by Soviet tank columns overrunning the Command Posts. As a result, both technology and technique have been developed for such a scenario. Any computer virus the PLA could develop will not reduce this capability - that is if they can infect Western C4I in the first place, a dubious proposition to say the very least. The People's Brigade idea has not been even taken seriously within the PLA itself. This time, however, the two SrCols fall for China's historical propaganda, that the People's War can overcome superior enemy technology and technique. However, People's War has never been meant to work in hostile territory and it never will. That and the fact that every field officer who has been in a brigade level exercise laughs himself silly at the suggestion of so easily dropping and maintaining two clandestine brigades into a hostile city so far from friendly lines. Strategic Successes Masking Tactical Failures Despite the PRC's non-interference policy, since the end of WWII, more Chinese soldiers have died on foreign soil than Russia, France, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US) combined. These casualties are mainly suffered during two wars, the Korean War (1950-1953) and the First Sino-Vietnam War (1979). Despite Chinese claims of brilliant strategic performances, the high casualty rates suggest severe tactical failings. China's entry into Korea on Oct 19, 1950 marked one of the highlights in PLA history. The Chinese managed to field the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 42nd Armies largely undetected and laid a trap for the US/UN forces. The People's Volunteer Army (PVA) managed to destroy several elements of the South Korean army as well as inflicted large damages on several international brigades. Yet, the operational requirements were far more ambitious. They meant to destroy the American 8th Army and the First Marine Expeditionary Force (1st MEF). Combat operations commenced on 25 October 1950. In a series of brilliant covert placements, the PVA managed to capture Unson on 2 November at a cost of around 10,000 casualties. However, significant American and United Nations (UN) Forces, the South Korean 8th Division and the US 24th Infantry Division escaped the traps. On 25 Nov, the PVA began their ambitious campaigns by surrounding both the 8th Army and the 1st MEF. The PVA's 113th Division captured Samso-ri on 28 Nov, cutting the UN's retreat to Sunchon while the Marines were surrounded at Choisin. Neither action was successful in containing the American forces. The 8th Army broke through and regrouped south of the 38th Parallel and the Marines escaped via sealift. The PVA clearly failed in their operational objectives but the fact that the 8th Army ran from North Korea allowed the PVA to claim of having destroyed all US/UN forces in North Korea. In complete contrast, no amount of strategic propaganda can cover the tactical failures of the Sino-Vietnam War. The campaign was racked by mistakes ranging from training and preparation to using a Red Army meatgrinder tactic that the PLA had neither the training, the resources nor the experience to perform. The problems arisen from the training should have stopped the campaign but no senior officer put a stop to an overly ambitious plan. The lack of proper maps and compasses resulted in troops getting lost during training. Radio waves wrapped themselves silly around the hilly terrain. Operations Officers did not have the training or experience to properly equip their troops resulting in units went without water for 24 to 48 hours after first contact. The terrain hampered effective artillery fire, forcing the PLA to rely on manpower for their meatgrinder tactics. The element of surprise had been lost. The Vietnamese battle hardened militia were well dug in and waiting. In contrast, the PLA mobilized second class garrison troops. The PLA's best-armed and best-trained troops faced a Northern possible much tougher Soviet retaliation. None of these deficiencies were addressed before the PLA attacked on 17 February 1979. The PLA attacked Vietnam through 26 points of entry. Immediately, the sheer volume of battle management overwhelmed the PLA's limited C3. The front line units were experiencing human and equipment casualties that cannot sustain battle momentum. Moreover, company commanders would rather wait for tank and recoilless rifle support before taking on Vietnamese entrenched positions. The front line units exhausted themselves, forcing a re-supply much earlier than planned. Re-enforcement and re-supply were brought forward to shore up the units. The 26 unwieldy prongs were consolidated into a more manageable 9 aiming at Cao Bang, Lang Son, Hang Lien Sen, Lai Chou and Quang Ninh. The final phase saw the heaviest fighting of the war, climaxing with the capture of Lang Son on 2 March. The Vietnamese adopted their favourite tactics of abandoning urban areas in favour of the built up surrounding hills. The PLA did not contest these strong points. Instead, they pushed through to the urban areas, taking them after fierce close quarter combat. None of the routes into these urban areas were what we in the West would consider secured. In the final analysis, it was the bellycrawler who accomplished the mission instead of the star-studded staff. The War Zone Campaign Deng Xia Peng laid the foundation for current PLA doctrine by stating that wars between the Great Powers would be a thing of the past. The new battleground would be fought between proxies and at times between a Great Power and a proxy. China, at the time, lacked proxies who can be used against the Soviet Red Army while the former USSR surrounded China with Indian, Mongolian, and Vietnamese defence pacts. Even combined, these three countries could not mount a serious threat to Chinese territorial integrity but they did pose a serious drain on Chinese military resources under wartime conditions. Therefore, the PLA must develop the ability to eliminate these countries' ability to wage offensive war before the Red Army could take advantage. However, significant military energies remained to thwart Soviet armoured threats. Those units stationed north got the best training and technology while Category B and reserve forces remained to deal with the southern fronts. Since the end of the Cold War, the PLA views no one is being capable of mounting a serious invasion of the Chinese homeland. However, local wars would continue to occur. The PLA saw the need to at least have the capability of controlling any threat to her borders. The War Zone Campaign is an attempt to develop the forces and the tactics necessary to secure China's borders, not through wars of attrition but to destroy an enemy's ability to wage immediate war in a very limited zone of operations. The War Zone Campaign deals significantly into luring, trapping, and destroying major hostile formations in a very limited but decisive action. A major component of this doctrine, however, is the ability to move forces heavier and faster than opposing forces. It is also a major problem. The War Zone Campaign differs significantly from the People's War Concept. In the People's War, the PLA can rely on large static formations deep within Chinese territory to outbleed Soviet tank columns. Significant logistic and transportation questions were bypassed since the Chinese would be fighting at home. The War Zone Campaign is to take the fight to the enemy and that essentially means transporting viable formations and supplies to the fight. The problem was how to adapt those large People's War formations into the more mobile War Zone Campaign. The obvious answer is that the PLA could not. The PLA lacks the necessary logistic and organizational capabilities. While the PLA has demonstrated it can move large formations in the hundreds of thousands of men, it cannot move fast enough to catch an enemy off guard. The 79 Sino-Vietnam War saw a well-entrenched and ready Vietnamese border defence. The answer was the formation of the Fist Units, much smaller formations that are easier to transport but requiring significantly more training and better equipment. Still, the War Zone Campaign inherited a lot from the PLA's traditional capabilities. Namely, a large tenacious but inflexible army. The rank and file could be expected to follow their orders to the death but initiative was not encouraged. There was no need to train fast thinking soldiers in Stalingrad type defences. Instead, tenacious troops who would outgrit and outbleed the enemy were required. This legacy did not allow the PLA to adopt a Western style of maneuver warfare by smaller, well trained, relatively higher innovative troops. Instead, the PLA fell back to a proven model of using cheaper trained but well motivated troops to accomplish this War Zone Campaign. The Red Army Model Historically, the only significant foreign military influence on the PLA was the Soviet Red Army. Throughout the 1950s to the mid 60s, Soviet advisors played a significant part on the PLA providing not only weapons but training as well. Soviet successes against a much more technical Nazi war machine provided the PLA a basis to use highly motivated troops against a more sophisticated enemy. The PLA seemed to take this to heart, including the kinds of officers required for this model. The PLA recently boasts much about how their military academies are producing officers by the thousands. However, this must be taken into context that the majority of these are Lieutenants (Lts) and Second Lieutenants (2Lts). The percentage of middle officers, the Captains (Capts) and Majors (Majs) going for further education, especially in the military arts, is much lower. If the trades are taken into consideration, then the number of field officers are significantly lower. Capts run kitchens and act as supply clerks; Sergeant posts in the West. Ballet dancers, full time athletes, and propaganda officers swell the officer corps, draining resources required by the combat arms (usually referred to as Infantry, Armoured Units, Artillery, and Combat Engineering). As with any military, there is a dividing line which once achieved by an officer that he can expect to go to the upper echelons. That rank in the PLA seems to be Senior Colonel (Brigadier General equivalent in the West). As such, the real battle management training does not begin until the Lieutenant Colonel and the Colonel ranks, specifically gearing towards a regimental command. Significantly, the Soviet Red Army viewed the regiment as the smallest independent combat unit. Under the Red Army system, the motorized rifle regiment was a key combat formation, comprising of 3 motor rifle battalions, each re-enforced by a tank company. Normally, the regimental commander could expect 3 to 4 artillery battalions in support. Added to this an air defence battalion and an engineering battalion. This gave the regimental commander significant assets to perform one to two echelon attacks, usually two motor rifle battalions on the main attack axis and a single motor rifle battalion on a flanking axis. It should be noted that this is a highly compartmentalized system. Artillery support for the infantry was restricted to the preparatory barrage. Battalion and company commanders were given objectives and they must plan accordingly to meet those objectives. Most often this meant getting their people into place and letting the actions take their own course. The one major weakness of this system is that it could not tolerate many surprises and it's up to the regimental commander to avoid as many of these surprises as possible. PLA Exercises to Date PLA exercises are marked with fanfare and great publicity. Grandiose statements about demonstrating an ability to meet specific political goals usually accompany these exercises. Never are these exercises allowed to fail in their stated attempts be it repulsing a Soviet attack or to take Taiwan back by force. The usual film footage is purposely designed to forward these messages and more often than not, the exercises are staged to give spectacular demonstrations of these capabilities. One of the largest exercises in recent PLA history is the 11 October 2000 Exercise and while most of it has been staged, it clearly demonstrates how the PLA aims to fight. The exercise itself was nothing more than a Hollywood production, watched by over one hundred generals and dignitaries. There were indeed impressive displays of individual unit prowess. Airborne troops performed a helicopter insertion by rappelling out of the helicopters and establishing a perimeter moments afterwards. New tanks and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) rushed through explosions to reach their objectives. Artillery performed a very impressive and colourful linear barrage right on schedule. Fighter planes played laser tag and hit floating targets without difficulties. None of these, however, demonstrate combat effectiveness as a whole. The helicopter insertion was done over cut grass, not reflective of the terrain difficulties of the theatres of operation the PLA is expected to perform in. In a real battle, those explosions the armour rushed through wouldn't be so conveniently placed nor timed. The artillery barrages, while colourful, did not demonstrate a sustained barrage capability. This being said, the timing of these events is certainly something to be considered. While no doubt, this exercise was mostly staged; it also demonstrated the PLA's ability to keep to a schedule. The tanks, planes, helicopters, artillery were all at the right place at the right time. Translating this to the battlefield means that any opposition can expect the PLA to be able to move substantial forces into place before battle. The enemy can also expect the PLA units to attack on time. The Theory of Attack The Attack is the primary focus of all PLA doctrine. Defence is viewed as a holding action until the proper resources is brought to bear for further attacks. Three forms of Attack is recognized: The Meeting Engagement is an encounter between two opposing forces on the move. The PLA views this as encountering a retreating hostile force while they are on the attack. The PLA force is expected to perform according to well-practised drills and Standard Operating Procedures. This is a reactive close quarter combat situation and the PLA believes the faster reacting commander wins the engagement. The PLA force can be expected to engage without pause or delay for planning or assessment purposes. The PLA strongly believes that this type of engagement is most common at the regimental level and below. The Hasty Attack is when an attacking PLA force comes upon an unexpected hostile static defence. The PLA commander is expected to immediately deploy his troops in the most advantageous position possible to launch an attack with minimal delay and minimal planning. The Deliberate Attack is often used when the Hasty Attack fails. Careful planning and proper distribution of forces and resources characterize this Attack. Most often, artillery is employed to soften up the defence before PLA units attack. For the regimental, battalion, and company commander, command expectations are not high since the Meeting Engagement is prevalent. The only time careful planning occurs is for the PLA force to mass overwhelming force in the Deliberate Attack. In the West, the Hasty Attack is the norm for small unit action. However, the PLA lacks the support mechanism, namely a strong Non-Commissioned Officer Corp, to perform the Hasty Attack effectively. A Western officer can expect his sub-ordinates to make decisions in support of his overall plan. Since PLA officers are expected to react for the most part, such decision-making processes are lacking in resources and training. This philosophy has allowed the PLA to field infantry very apt at the traditional infantry skills. Since the regular soldier can expect his officer to engage him without planning and assessment, he must overcome his own personal opposition by his own personal skill level. The regular soldier cannot expect his officer to maneuver reserves for support This system also bypasses certain PLA weaknesses, namely the lack of a good C4I infrastructure. The units are given orders beforehand and can expect no last minute deviation, thus avoiding the need for a strong tactical communication net. While the West may be able to field superior units, they are also saddled with operational complexities that the PLA general does not have. The PLA infantry are expected to fight as-is and not requiring any further support from engineer, artillery, or armour assets. A Western general has to prioritize when and how his front line units get the required support.
The Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR) is the PLA's smallest combined arms unit. It normally comprises of three Motorized Rifle Battalions (MRBs), a heavy mortar battalion, an anti-tank company, a engineer company, a transportation company, a medical company, an air defence company, one signals company, one headquarters company, a chemical platoon, and a reconnaissance platoon. While the MRR can operate as part of a division or an army group, it is also an independent formation that can be deployed alone. The MRR's main goal is to envelop a hostile force up to battalion size by simultaneously striking the front with strong firepower, enveloping the enemy, and penetrating to up to a hostile division's rear area. The MRR attacks with two or more echelons with the main effort to lock the enemy into place while flanking attacks, backed by massive artillery, try to envelop the enemy. The goal is to cut the enemy's escape route and to prevent re-supplies and re-enforcement from reaching the enemy. In effect, to force the enemy to surrender or be killed. Operationally, the MRR approaches a Deliberate Attack along classic infantry lines. Namely, • Reconnaissance • Evaluation and Preparation • Artillery Barrage • Multi-echelon attacks • Penetration • Securing the area The reconnaissance platoon usually scouts about 20 to 30 kilometres ahead of the main body. There is both a passive and active role for this force. Initially, the platoon would try to avoid direct contact with the enemy while trying to identify the enemy's key logistical, C3, and tactical concentrations as well as key terrain features. This information is then relayed, by foot if necessary, to the regimental headquarters. As the regimental main body organizes into their battalion lines of deployment, the reconnaissance platoon would then directly engage the enemy in order to reveal the enemy's disposition, strength, and fire plan.
The MRR organizes a Deliberate Attack into a main direct attack echelon and a flanking attack echelon. The composition is usually two MRBs for the frontal attack and one MRB for the flanking maneuver. The two echelons usually attack simultaneously. The target list provided by the reconnaissance platoon is evaluated and the Regimental Artillery Group (RAG) is tasked to handle this list in priority. The Air Defence Company is expected to protect the RAG and the Command Posts. For the attacking echelons, air defence is passive, relying on speed and stealth for protection. The MRBs also would rely on hugging tactics during engagment for protection against enemy firepower. By intermixing with the enemy, enemy airpower and artillery would be presented with hitting their own people as well as the MRBs.
In classic PLA terms, the RAG is employed in rolling barrage fashion, screening the advancing MRBs with both smoke and high explosives. The RAG's role includes obstacle breaching including cutting wire, clearing minefields. Suppression of enemy fire is critical in supporting the MRBs. When the MRBs are fully engaged, the RAG shifts away from direct support to targeting enemy logistical and command assets. Special attention is giving to enemy reserve units who might be coming up to shore up the defences. If the MRR is attacking as part of a Division or Army Group, additional artillery battalions may be part of the barrage and direct support assets. The PLA has invested much in new artillery fire control systems (FCS), giving the PLA the ability to quickly calculate fire mission data. This ability is needed to counter previously undetected threats. However, the lacks of resources meant that the PLA can only equipped and train relatively few units. Initially, these would be Army Groups' Artillery Regiments. If attached to support the MRR attack, the breaching company can expect these systems to provide much faster, more accurate, and heavier indirect fire support to keep the breach open. The Lines of Deployment (LD) for the MRBs is extremely close to the Forward Edge of the Battle Area because of this purpose. The opposing force cannot be allowed time to recover from the artillery barrage and the MRB would have to engage almost immediately after the barrage ceases. By definition, this would be a Meeting Engagement since neither the attacker nor the defender would have time to access the damage done by the artillery. As stated before, the MRR attacks with a multi-echelon assault. While the main frontal attack is designed to tie down the enemy force, front line units in all echelons are to bypass strong points if at all possible. The follow up force would be tasked with defeating these strong points. The main goal of the front units is to try to hit the rear areas, forcing the enemy to surrender or be killed. The MRR can be expected to re-enforce any penetration with determination. Stalled units can be expected to keep their opposing force occupied. However, upon an enemy collapse, those units can be expected to shift into supporting the penetration. Once the rear area has been reached, the MRR's task is to secure from possible counter-attacks. Initially, simple mines would be laid across the enemy's main counter-attacking axis. However, as time allows more elaborate defence measures, company size layouts would be errected. Since the PLA views defence as a temporary measure, fall back positions are often ignored in favour of establishing Artillery Fire Concentration zones.
The Russian Motorized Rifle Regiment The Russian Motorized Regiment is heavier and faster than its Chinese counterpart but recent events suggest the Russians had opted for deliberate firepower than for speed. Russian equipment for the most part were designed for the lightning strike across Europe during the height of the Cold War but the two wars in Chechnya had forced the Russians to relearn lessons of WWII urban war.
The main problems encountered in Chechnya were that the rebels did not run away as per usual guerrilla warfare when faced with overwhelming odds. In actual fact, the rebels decided to fight it out, rendering the envelopment a moot tactic. Direct infantry assaults were often catastrophic, lacking in enough fire support and were gunned down by rebel hand held rockets. Firepower became more important as the Russians dragged their artillery, anti-tank, and anti-air units into the fight, often employing them in point blank direct fire mode. Battle hardened experience and adaptation the Chinese have not the chance to learn.
Final Notes The MRR is a very robust organization centering heavily on the use of well-disciplined and well-trained troops supported by massive firepower. It minimizes PLA weaknesses while maximizing its strengths. The lack of an effective C3 experience, knowledge, and equipment makes a combined supporting arms operation hard to achieve. By effectively isolating the sub-ordinate units from support, the MRR bypasses this problem. Instead, the MRR aims to create chaos amongst enemy ranks while relying on a faster reacting commander sending in well-disciplined and well-drilled troops to outslug the opposition individual soldiers. Much depends on the operational plan. While the battalions and companies are expected to fight their local actions without support, the problem remains have they been given the correct objectives? Penetration forces may easily be directed into killing zones or simply ending up where they would be of no use. At the tactical level, the only solution is to ensure a proper operational plan. And that is the main problem with this, the PLA has not demonstrated that they can consistently come up with good operational plans. There is no doubt the PLA can perform an operation brilliantly but a poor plan would still result in poor results no matter how brilliant the execution.
Concluding Remarks The PLA's MRR doctrine is obviously aimed at the PRC's southern neighbours. It currently lacks the responsiveness and the speed of its rear echelon units to overcome Western Task Forces/Battle Groups. The PLA might very well be able to seize the initiative but be very hard pressed to keep it. Western forces currently enjoy overwhelming mobility, precision firepower, and co-ordination capabilities the PLA currently does not have. Given such circumstances, the Western commander has more resources to react with then that of the PLA commander even though the PLA commander may react first. However, the PRC's southern neighbours lacked such sophistication. The best force facing the PLA would be the Indian Army and that is still a traditional classic infantry army with very limited mobility and co-ordination, especially around the Himalayan terrain that both sides are saddled with. The doctrine does give the PLA somewhat better mobility to move small forces around. Whether that is enough to destroy an enemy's ability to wage war is open to question. An enemy army may be surrounded but it is far from dead and still capable of exacting extreme casualties. The besieged Paulis made the Red Army pay in blood at Stanligrad and Bastion was key to the Allied victory at the Battle of the Bulge. As noted though, the PLA does not think in tactical terms but in the geo-political strategic sphere. Whatever the operational objectives and tactical performances were in China's victories, these did not stop the PLA from achieving several large strategic goals. In the Korean War, that's eviction of the Americans from North Korea and in the Sino-Vietnam Wars, Vietnamese and therefore, Soviet expansion in South East Asia was checked. To the PLA thinking, the initiative is almost an operational goal in itself. In China's wars in Korea, India, and Vietnam, the Chinese kept the initiative no matter how bad the operational and tactical situation. That in itself is a formidable task, forcing the enemy to react to Chinese moves, instead of dictating the battle itself. This includes withdrawing and denying the enemy even a chance at a well-fought victory. Given such designs, it is hard to imagine the PLA being in life and death struggles such as Stalingrad but rather pitted against forces that would deny the PLA the initiative. If the PLA manages to get the initiative in the first place, then the MRR is designed to keep it, hitting the enemy before they can mount a successful counter-attack.
După 30 de ani de restricţii privind natalitatea, China va relaxa politica unicului copil. Regimul comunist a încercat în ultimele decenii să limiteze creşterea demografică în ţară, dar îmbătrânirea populaţiei a determinat autorităţile să-şi schimbe viziunea.
Astfel, oficialii de la Beijing vor lansa un program pilot în cinci provincii ale ţării, în care cuplurile vor putea avea un al doilea copil, dar cu condiţia ca cei doi părinţi să fie copii unici. Proiectul va fi extins la sfârşitul anului viitor şi în Beijing.
Din 2014 restricţia copilului unic în familie ar urma să fie eliminată la nivel naţional. Analiştii spun că politica unui singur copil îşi arată acum efectele secundare în China, care se confruntă cu o lipsă acută de forţă de muncă, mai ales în mediul rural. Şi aceasta în condiţiile în care economia ţării nu a fost lovită de recesiune şi înregistrează creşteri.[/link][/link]
Daca ar accepta chinezii astia o infuzie de rromi,poate ca i-am putea ajuta.Poate nu la capitolul "forta de munca" dar la natalitate sigur. Plus ca sunt cosmopoliti oamenii,si ar veni de la Paris,Roma,Londra,Bruxelles via Bucuresti.
Poate ca ar trebui sa dea o lege prin care sa ii lase pe chinezii stabiliti prin alte tari sa aduca in tara si copii nascuti prin tarile europei si nu numai.S-ar rezolva problema ..fara cosmopoliti.
Off-topic ?! Stiti,desigur,ca exista tigani/rromi în China,si ca sunt acolo dinainte de a fi ajuns prin Europa.Cunoasteti,desigur,felul în care dinastia Yuan i-a recuperat pe tigani în folosul economiei regionale.Chineze.În fine,asta scrie Cai Hongsheng. Dar daca ziceti ca e off-topic,asa sa fie.
Am auzit eu ceva cu tiganii numiti intr-o vreme micii tatari pt. ca veneau agatati de coada astora,dar nimic mai mult.Zi Boribum cum fu cu tiganii si mongolii,ca sa nu mor prost.
Familiile mai instarite fac tratamente de fertilitate pt. a avea gemeni.Politica singurului copil a avut printre altele efectul ca baietii depasesc fetele cam cu vreo 30 de milioane(strict in randul tinerei generatii).Practica culturala sa favorizezi baietii.Asta incepe sa genereze probleme prin tarile vecine,intrucat chinezii importa neveste,iar fenomenul se va amplifica.Cu cat lucrurile se schimba,cu atat raman la fel.Elena secolului 21 e din Jakarta sau Manilla.
Nu e vorba despre cum a fost,ci despre cum este (o discutie de la Luri încoace e grele rau) . Ca sunt luoli,ca sunt moluo,rolul lor demografic si economic în China actuala e orice numai insignifiant nu e (vezi Directiva Partidului în regiunea Lanzhou din 2000). Numai ca nu vreau sa gargarisesc si off-topic-esc,asa încât îmi permit sa o las pe Ex-ad sa continue în mod profesionist expunerea.
Edit : acum câteva zile,China a condamnat foarte dur pozitia Frantei în legatura cu tiganii. Totodata,China si U.E au discutii permanente în legatura cu non-respectul drepturilor omului în China. Si totusi,China a fost foarte virulenta în reactia ei cu privire la tigani. Stiti de ce,nu ?
Prima replica cu tiganii/rromii avea un raport cu asta,si mai ales cu economia chineza. Bafto delo (nu stiu cum e în chineza).
Cel puţin 200 de obuze de artilerie au lovit insula sud-coreeană locuită Yeonpyeong şi au incendiat zeci de case. Un martor a declarat pentru un post sud-coreean de televiziune că între 60 şi 70 de case sunt în flăcări.
Phenianul a deschis focul la ora locală 14.34 (7.34 ora României), iar armata sud-coreeană a replicat cu 80 de runde de artilerie şi a ordonat decolarea unor avioane de luptă.
Preşedintele sud-coreean Lee Myung-Bak, care a convocat de urgenţă o reuniune a guvernului după incidentul armat de marţi cu Phenianul, a dat asigurări că administraţia sa ia măsuri pentru a evita ca un schimb de focuri să escaladeze într-un război, relatează CNN.
Armata sud-coreeană se află în alertă şi este pregătită pentru posibile noi incidente armate.
Imagini cu coloane de fum au fost transmise de posturile de televiziune, iar insula a rămas fără curent electric, dar nu este clar deocamdată ce a fost lovit.
Insula vizată are circa 1.300 de locuitori, a declarat un pescar pentru Yonhap. Unii locuitori au început să fugă pe continent, care se află la o distanţă de 145 de kilometri. Alţii se adăpostesc în şcoli. Autorităţile le-au cerut civililor să se ascundă în buncăre.
Potrivit Euronews, armata sud-coreeană se află în alertă maximă, iar civilii de pe insula Yeonpyeong au fost evacuaţi în buncăre.
Incidentul intervine la câteva zile după ce un expert american a primit acces la un centru modern nord-coreean de îmbogăţire a uraniului. Recent, New York Times relata un episod petrecut în cursul acestei luni, în care autorităţile nord-coreene i-ar fi prezentat unui cercetător american, aflat în vizită în Coreea de Nord, o centrală nucleară construită în secret, destinată activităţilor de îmbogăţire a uraniului.
Mai mult, în luna august, Coreea de Nord a ameninţat că va riposta violent, drept urmare a exerciţiilor militare dintre Coreea de Sud şi Statelee Unite. "Reacţia militară a Republicii Democrate Populare Coreea va fi cea mai aspră pedeapsă văzută vreodată în lume", a declarat un purtător de cuvânt al armatei nord-coreene, într-un comunicat transmis de agenţia oficială de ştiri a ţării.
Legăturile dintre Corei s-au deteriorat semnificativ după scufundarea, la 26 martie a, unei nave sud-coreene, incident în care 46 de militari au murit. O anchetă internaţională a spus că nava a fost lovită de o torpilă nord-coreeană, însă Phenianul a negat orice implicare
Jurnaliştii din Coreea de Sud declară război Coreei de Nord Autor: Oana Ţepeş Greuruş
Schimbul de focuri de ieri dintre Coreea de Sud şi Coreea de Nord e subiectul de primă pagină în presa de la Seul. Bilanţul atacului a ajuns la patru morţi, doi soldaţi şi doi civili. Astăzi, au fost găsite trupurile neînsufleţite a doi localnici, scrie BBC.
Coreea de Nord a bombardat insula sud-coreeană Yeonpyeong
"În faţa unui atac duşman, e necesară o atitudine determinată pentru a sancţiona inamicul", continuă aceeaşi sursă.
"Un atac fanatic", titrează ziarul JoongAng Ilbo, care face apel la o ripostă fermă: "Peninsula e în flăcări. Nu vom putea tolera niciodată un atac împotriva civililor."
"Aceste agresiuni nu vor înceta niciodată. Responsabilii nord-coreeni şi-au demonstrat brutalitatea şi lipsa de conştiinţă. Trebuie să lansăm un atac", titrează ziarul.
Pentru cotidianul de limbă engleză JoongAng Daily, atacul nord-coreenilor trezeşte amintiri încă proaspete despre războiul dintre cele două Corei şi confirmă din nou trista realitate că o astfel de tragedie se poate repeta în orice moment.
"Avertizăm solemn Nordul că dacă vrea să se joacă în continuare cu focul, va sfârşi mai devreme sau mai târziu pierind în focul pe care singul l-a declanşat".
Un alt cotidian de limbă engleză de la Seul, Korea Times, subliniează că este vorba despre primul atac împotriva civililor după atentatul din 1987 de la bordul unui Boeing al Korean Airlines.
115 oameni au murit atunci, iar atacul a fost atribuit nord-coreenilor. În plus, bombardamentul de ieri soldat cu 2 morţi şi 18 răniţi este primul atac împotriva unei insule sud-coreene după războiul din 1953.
Bombardamentul îi consolidează puterea succesorului lui Kim Jong Il
Acest atac pare să se înscrie în strategia care vizează consolidarea puterii liderilor nord-coreeni înainte de preluarea mandatului de succesorul lui Kim Jong Il, mezinul acestuia, Kim Jong-Un, notează publicaţia.
De aceeaşi părere e şi premierul sud-coreean, Kim Hwang-Sik.
"Phenianul încearcă să proclame vitejia militară a posibilului moştenitor Kim Jong-Un, să întărească unitatea naţională şi să mute spre exterior nemulţumirea populaţiei nord-coreene".
Şi ministrul sud-coreean al apărării, Kim Tae-Young, are aceeaşi opinie: "Coreea de Nord a lansat atacul pentru a consolida procesul de succesiune, arătând capacităţile conducătorului Kim Jong-Un".
În plus, după ce a dezvăluit informaţii privind uzina sa de îmbogăţire a uraniului pe 12 noiembrie, Coreea de Nord a trecut la tiruri de artilerie pentru a-i da lui Kim Jong-Un statutul de lider puternic, a mai declarat ministrul, potrivit Yonhap.
Tot azi, ca răspuns la atacul nord-coreean, guvernul sud-coreean a decis să suspende ajutorul umanitar promis Coreei de Nord, după inundaţiile din luna august.
Iar în capitala Coreei de Sud, la Seul, zeci de oameni au protestat în stradă, furioşi în urma ataculul lansat de nord-coreeni. Manifestanţii au incendiat steagul Coreei de Nord şi portretul liderului de la Phenian, Kim Jong Il.
China a început "colonizarea" economică a Americii Latine Autor: Paul Ciocoiu
China a devenit al doilea partener comercial al Americii Latine, situându-se imediat în urma Statelor Unite ale Americii, dar înaintea Uniunii Europene, scrie în ediţia de luni cotidianul spaniol El Pais, preluat de Agerpres.
Totuşi, unii funcţionari şi oameni de afaceri latino-americani atrag atenţia cu privire la riscurile asocierii cu China, dată fiind concurenţa pe care o reprezintă exporturile industriale ale gigantului asiatic şi interesul companiilor chinezeşti - majoritatea cu acţiuni deţinute de stat şi cotate la bursă - de a intra în posesia terenurilor în ale căror subsoluri se află resurse naturale care interesează Beijingul.
Astfel, la un summit de afaceri recent China-America Latină, organizat în oraşul Chengdu, capitala provinciei chineze Sichuan, omul de afaceri brazilian Nizan Guanaes, preşedinte al grupului de comunicaţii ABC şi participant la Forumul Economic de la Davos, a avertizat că "am fost deja colonizaţi o dată şi nu mai vrem să mai repetăm figura. Vrem să fim parteneri".
Schimburi comerciale record în doar un deceniu
China şi America Latină nu aveau practice schimburi comerciale în anul 2000, însă zece ani mai târziu volumul acestora crescut de 11 ori. Când preşedintele chinez Hu Jintao a vizitat pentru prima oară continental sud-american, în 2004, a prevăzut că schimburile comerciale dintre cele două părţi vor ajunge la 72 miliarde de euro în 2010 şi că investiţiile companiilor chineze vor totaliza tot 72 de miliarde de euro între 2004 şi 2014.
Investiţiile chineze în America Latină, care până în 2009 reprezentau mai puţin de unu la sută din capitalurile străine care din regiune, au crescut spectaculos în primele nouă luni ale anului 2010, odată cu anunţarea unor investiţii de aproape 17 miliarde de euro. Însă din cele 19 investiţii majore chineze anunţate în America Latină din 2005 şi până în prezent, doar patru aveau să vizeze industria şi infrastructura, celelalte având legătură cu producţia de materii prime.
Interes, dar şi precauţie
In faţa "invaziei" chineze, unele state sud-americane s-au repliat şi au adoptat măsuri de protecţie. Brazilia a limitat deja, în acest an, vânzarea de proprietăţi importante către străini. Uruguay intenţionează, la rândul său, să interzică vânzarea de proprietăţi mari către alte state, în timp ce Congresul argentinian analizează un proiect de lege care restrânge accesul străinilor la proprietatea asupra terenurilor. Nu se pune problema ca executivele latino-americane să pună piedici în calea relaţiilor cu China, însă doresc să fixeze totuşi nişte limite, comentează El Pais.
"Împărtăşim idealul unei creşteri cu incluziune socială, dar un scenariu în care noi am fi doar exportatori de materii prime poate bloca atingerea acestui obiectiv primordial", explică subsecretarul pe probleme de comerţ internaţional al Argentinei, Ariel Schale. Directorul pe probleme de comerţ internaţional al Braziliei, Luiz Fernando Antonio, recunoaşte că fierul, soia şi ţiţeiul reprezintă 80 la sută din exporturile ţării sale către China. "În schimb, importăm echipamente electronice", precizează el. 'Nimeni nu vrea să se transforme doar în producător de materii prime", admite Antonio, însă spune că responsabilitatea aparţine Americii Latine.
Coreea de Nord a bombardat insula sud-coreeană Yeonpyeong
"În faţa unui atac duşman, e necesară o atitudine determinată pentru a sancţiona inamicul", continuă aceeaşi sursă.
Care dusman?! Sunt coreeni cu totii! Asta este doar un alt razboi fratricid, purtat de politicieni iresponsabili impotriva propriului popor.
005 wrote ...
"Un atac fanatic", titrează ziarul JoongAng Ilbo, care face apel la o ripostă fermă: "Peninsula e în flăcări. Nu vom putea tolera niciodată un atac împotriva civililor."
Pretext. In rest, doar exagerare, manipulare, ipocrizie.
005 wrote ...
"Aceste agresiuni nu vor înceta niciodată. Responsabilii nord-coreeni şi-au demonstrat brutalitatea şi lipsa de conştiinţă. Trebuie să lansăm un atac", titrează ziarul.
Astia abia asteapta, parca ei au pregatit acest scenariu si acum si-l sustin.
005 wrote ...
"Avertizăm solemn Nordul că dacă vrea să se joacă în continuare cu focul, va sfârşi mai devreme sau mai târziu pierind în focul pe care singur l-a declanşat".
Amenintari?! Partizanat?! Nu mi se pare deloc diplomatic.
005 wrote ...
Un alt cotidian de limbă engleză de la Seul, Korea Times, subliniează că este vorba despre primul atac împotriva civililor după atentatul din 1987 de la bordul unui Boeing al Korean Airlines.
De aceeaşi părere e şi premierul sud-coreean, Kim Hwang-Sik.
"Phenianul încearcă să proclame vitejia militară a posibilului moştenitor Kim Jong-Un, să întărească unitatea naţională şi să mute spre exterior nemulţumirea populaţiei nord-coreene".
Şi ministrul sud-coreean al apărării, Kim Tae-Young, are aceeaşi opinie: "Coreea de Nord a lansat atacul pentru a consolida procesul de succesiune, arătând capacităţile conducătorului Kim Jong-Un".
În plus, după ce a dezvăluit informaţii privind uzina sa de îmbogăţire a uraniului pe 12 noiembrie, Coreea de Nord a trecut la tiruri de artilerie pentru a-i da lui Kim Jong-Un statutul de lider puternic, a mai declarat ministrul, potrivit Yonhap.
Tot azi, ca răspuns la atacul nord-coreean, guvernul sud-coreean a decis să suspende ajutorul umanitar promis Coreei de Nord, după inundaţiile din luna august.
Iar în capitala Coreei de Sud, la Seul, zeci de oameni au protestat în stradă, furioşi în urma ataculul lansat de nord-coreeni. Manifestanţii au incendiat steagul Coreei de Nord şi portretul liderului de la Phenian, Kim Jong Il.
Criminal! Interese meschine, lupta pentru putere, capital politic, iar populatia - masa de manevra. Si carne de tun...
"Coreea de Sud a început, luni dimineaţa (20 decembrie 2010), exerciţiile militare în apropierea imediată a graniţei cu Republica Populară Democrată Coreeană. Specialiştii atenţionează în legătură cu serioasele riscuri politico-militare, sociale şi ecologice ale unui potenţial conflict de anvergură dintre cele două Corei", notează cotidianul rus Nezavisimaia Gazeta, citat de Agerpres.
"Moscova consideră, la rândul său, că manevrele cu tiruri de artilerie ale sud-coreenilor, desfăşurate pe insula Yeonpyeong, ar putea deteriora şi mai mult situaţia deja tensionată din regiune. Rusia, care are graniţă comună cu RPDC, are de ce să se teamă, subliniază cotidianul. În cazul în care conflictul va escalada, este posibil un aflux de refugiaţi şi o catastrofă ecologică în zonă. "În Coreea de Sud există 20 de centrale nucleare, care ar putea fi distruse cu arme obişnuite. Aceasta înseamnă 20 de noi Cernobâluri. De altfel, şi în Coreea de Nord există obiective nucleare", declară Voronţov, expert în cadrul Institutului de Orientalistică al Academiei de Ştiinţe din Rusia. În afară de aceasta, acţiunile militare din Peninsula Coreeană vor obliga ţările vecine, inclusiv Rusia, China şi SUA, să-şi plaseze în stare de pregătire totală de luptă propriile forţe armate. "Din experienţa campaniei irakiene ştim că, în pofida utilizării de arme cu precizie înaltă, uneori erau afectate şi ţările vecine", atenţionează analistul rus. În opinia lui Voronţov, conflictul dintre cele două Corei ar putea fi unul îndelungat şi incontrolabil, putând escalada într-un al treilea Război Mondial, în care SUA să se confrunte cu China.
Între timp, poziţia Washingtonului stârneşte întrebări, subliniază Nezavisimaia Gazeta. Astfel, SUA nu au acceptat convocarea, sâmbătă trecută, a Consiliului de Securitate al Organizaţiei Naţiunilor Unite /ONU/, după cum solicita Moscova. Se aşteaptă ca circa 20 de militari americani să ia parte la actualele manevre sud-coreene. Phenianul afirmă că sud-coreenii se folosesc de americani ca de un scut, dar nu au ezitat să ameninţe cu "atacuri imprevizibile în scopul autoapărării". La rândul său, Departamentul de Stat al SUA a declarat că exerciţiile militare ale Seulului sunt unele întemeiate în ceea ce priveşte asigurarea securităţii şi că partea sud-coreeană are dreptul la ele.
În opinia lui Voronţov, manevrele sud-coreenilor relevă iluziile Seulului, conform cărora schimbarea regimului din RPDC ar fi posibilă prin amplificarea presiunilor şi izolării. "Coreea de Sud şi SUA şi-au pus de acord poziţiile. În afară de aceasta, Washingtonul primeşte o pârghie pentru a-şi înteţi presiunile asupra Chinei, deoarece situaţia îi oferă posibilPC, de aitatea de a-şi desfăşura forţele militare pe perimetrul graniţelor R organiza exerciţii în Marea Galbenă, în apropierea imediată de malurile şi principalele centre ale Chinei", explică expertul.
Totuşi, un conflict de anvergură nu este în avantajul nimănui. După ce desfăşurase o vizită la Phenian, guvernatorul statului New Mexico, Bill Richardson, le-a propus militarilor din RPDC să stabilească o linie directă cu cei din sud şi, de asemenea, să înfiinţeze o comisie militară pentru monitorizarea crizelor de la Marea Galbenă, comisie din care să facă parte SUA şi cele două Corei.
Nezavisimaia Gazeta remarcă faptul că SUA nu par să dorească prezenţa Rusiei şi Chinei în această comisie. Deocamdată, Phenianul a refuzat propunerea SUA Sursa: Ziua veche LINK
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Off-topic ?! Stiti,desigur,ca exista tigani/rromi în China,si ca sunt acolo dinainte de a fi ajuns prin Europa.Cunoasteti,desigur,felul în care dinastia Yuan i-a recuperat pe tigani în folosul economiei regionale.Chineze.În fine,asta scrie Cai Hongsheng. Dar daca ziceti ca e off-topic,asa sa fie. 
